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The Competitive Impact of China on Southeast Asia’s 
Labor Markets* 
 
Rajah Rasiah** 
 
1 Introduction 
China’s entry in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 left several 
labor-intensive-economies worried over their export prospects in world markets. 
While the spotlight was very much on India and Mexico – two economies that 
witnessed a sharp contraction in apparel exports since the 1990s – Southeast 
Asian economies had also quietly monitored these developments for fear of 
losing their export markets.  Despite these anxieties, China and Southeast Asia 
are working jointly to establish a combined free trade region by 2010. 
 
China’s expansion in global trade and investment flows is not a new 
phenomenon. Since rapprochement with the United States in the 1970s, 
economic transition has stimulated export expansion and inward Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) flows to China. The communist regime has carefully managed 
integration into the capitalist system making it the world’s chief exporter of 
labor-intensive goods such as garments. Hence, China’s entry into the WTO is 
unlikely to generate a sudden gigantic splash and a massive shakeout in global 
trade and investment flows. However, the implementation of the Trade Related 
aspects of Investment Management (TRIMs) in particular is expected to bring 
wide ramifications for developing economies.1 In addition to the reduction of 
tariffs and removal of actionable subsidies and quotas, the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement (MFA) will end by the end of 2004. The latter will remove the 
significance of quotas as a basis for targeting textile and garment production. 
While these developments on paper are considered to enhance export 
penetration in the major markets, it will also expose Southeast Asian economies 
to cheaper imports. With a massive labor force, China by far poses the largest 
threat to labor-intensive exporters in Southeast Asia. Its large labor force, low 
wages and agglomeration economies make China a far more attractive site for 
FDI. 
 
                                                          
*  Paper presented at a DIR Seminar with the same title, 12 December 2002. 
** Professor and Senior Research Fellow, UNU-INTECH. I am grateful to Norbert von 
Hofmann, Erwin Schweisshelm, Roland Feicht and the FES for renewing their interest in 
research on trade unions and labor markets. I am grateful to Sanjaya Lall for sharing his 
UNIDO paper prepared with Albedejeho (2001) with me, Gerd Botterweck and others at the 
Singapore Workshop for their insightful comments. I am also grateful to Ad Notten for his 
generous help in getting materials from the library. Brunei and East Timor were excluded 
from analysis. the former because of its economic reliance on just oil, and the latter because 
it became independent only recently and hence does not have sufficient data for analysis. 
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The increased competition to export and attract FDI could heighten pressures to 
race to the bottom in the Southeast Asian economies. Low wages, poor labor 
standards – including the utilization of child labor – is expected to apply 
pressure on Southeast Asian labor markets. Governments – responding to the 
interests of firms – could assume short-termist strategies to tighten controls on 
trade unions – to compete with exports from China and to slow down wage 
growth. Neo-liberal arguments posit that liberalization will free factors of 
production so that market-determined allocations will eventually see the 
employment of resources for factor incomes to equalize. However, power 
asymmetry between firms, institutions and governments, prevalence of structural 
interdependence, and complementarity between and increasing returns in certain 
industries, and inherent rigidities in labor markets make such contentions 
suspect (see Rasiah, 2000). In addition, contrary to claims, even when approving 
sanctions on the powerful nations, developing economies have had more 
deleterious effects than the developed under the WTO.   
 
This paper aims to examine the impact of China’s entry in the WTO on 
Southeast Asian labor markets. The first section examines China’s potential 
impact by comparing its manufacturing valued added and export structure, and 
FDI with Southeast Asia. 
 
2 Analytic Framework 
While competitiveness is relatively easy to conceive, it is difficult to estimate 
inter-country data to show it concretely. Apart from relatively inexhaustive 
instruments, the lack of micro-level data at the industry level makes 
comparisons of competitiveness difficult. Hence, this paper uses second best 
methods by deploying selected proxies to examine the potential competitive 
impact of China’s greater integration in world and regional markets for labor 
markets in Southeast Asia. The use of historical data has both its strengths and 
weaknesses. Its strengths include the projections that could be made to 
comprehend the potential economic consequences of greater integration. The 
limitations include the potential diversions to projected growth that can be 
expected from policy shifts as well as random factors.2 Nevertheless, this 
approach seems to be the most plausible for evaluating the impact of China on 
Southeast Asian labor markets as forms the prime basis for projecting the 
future.3 
 
The paper examines China’s impact first by evaluating comparatively the effects 
of greater integration involving production, trade, FDI flows and institutional 
support. These variables will definitely have a bearing on the capacity of 
Southeast Asia to compete following China’s greater integration in global and 
regional markets. The paper subsequently looks at the impact of these variables 
on Southeast Asian labor markets. Because labor force, unemployment rates and 
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wages are labor market variables they are discussed in the latter section – 
despite their obvious link with competitiveness. It should also be noted that 
China is already considerably integrated in world markets.   
 
The four proxies examined are manufacturing value added, manufactured 
exports, FDI flows and infrastructure support. The size and technological 
structure of manufacturing value added was evaluated, but it does not present a 
good picture of competitiveness. Manufactured exports were examined at the 
aggregate level, including technological structure and shares of critical exports 
in world markets. This proxy is a better indicator of what to expect when greater 
integration takes place. FDI flows – both the overall shares and its relative 
intensity in gross fixed capital formation – give an indication of China’s likely 
impact on the FDI dependent economies of Southeast Asia. Basic and R&D 
infrastructure offer a comparative assessment of institutional support for 
industrial firms – domestic and foreign owned – in the region. Fuller integration 
would mean that the institutional support facilities would play a greater role in 
the location of industries in the combined region. 
 
Finally, the implications of China’s greater integration in world and regional 
markets are examined from observed shifts in trade, FDI flows and institutional 
support facilities on labor markets in Southeast Asia. The size of the labor force 
of the countries involved, employment size and elasticity, unemployment rates, 
labor productivity, wages and unit labor costs, trade unions and labor standards 
will have a strong bearing on both static competitiveness as well as impact.  
 
3 China and Southeast Asia Compared 
Southeast Asia as a whole had 36.6 percent and 71.1 percent of China’s 1.25 
billion population and GDP respectively in 1999,4 making it vulnerable to 
greater trade and investment liberalization, particularly involving labor-intensive 
economic activities – both low and high technology. China’s per capita income 
in 1995 prices of US$769 in 1999 was much higher than that of Cambodia, 
Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos, and was only slightly lower than that of Indonesia 
and Philippines.  
 
Increased markets from integration can benefit regional specialization based on 
the economic law of comparative advantage. On the one hand it offers 
complementarity potential for a regional division of labor to support 
differentiated inter-country exports and to a smaller extent expand export 
demand. On the other hand China’s massive labor force and export 
manufacturing capability will provide stiff competition for Southeast exports 
and FDI inflows. Much of the manufacturing value added generated in Southeast 
Asia compete with industries in China. In addition, Southeast Asian economies 
are not positioned above China in the learning curve involving several industries 
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– e.g. garments and electronics assembly. Hence, China’s further integration 
could cause some hollowing out in Southeast Asia. However, China is already 
considerably integrated in global markets and hence greater integration is not 
going to suddenly cause a disarray in Southeast Asian economic activities. 
Besides, given labor market and bureaucratic rigidities and safety clauses 
contained in trade agreements to avert economic calamities, Southeast Asia’s 
industries are unlikely to evaporate explosively.   
 
This section compares important economic conditions of China and Southeast 
Asia.  The first examines the structure of manufacturing value added. The 
second looks at the export structure. The third evaluates FDI flows and the 
fourth infrastructure support facilities. 
 
Manufacturing Value Added 
China’s manufacturing value added in the combined region increased steadily in 
the 1990s to its peak of 75.9 percent in 1998 (see Figure 1, Table 1). The 
expansion was particularly rapid in the 1990s when China became more 
integrated in export markets. The sheer size of China’s manufacturing value 
added, which has grown significantly faster than any of the Southeast Asian 
economies in the 1990s presents significant economic implications for the latter. 
In addition to economies of scale and scope, China enjoys united command for 
launching complex economic activities that can out-compete similar but 
fragmented operations in Southeast Asia. China’s manufacturing structure 
would benefit from greater differentiation and division of labor than Southeast 
Asia’s under its unified bureaucratic regulation. 
 
China’s manufacturing value added structure is accounted largely by medium 
and high technology products, albeit confined to lower value added segments of 
value chains. Singapore enjoys greater specialization in such products – with 
stronger participation in design operations. Only Malaysia among the remaining 
Southeast Asian economies, compares favorably with China. Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines made significantly greater upgrading than 
China in the period 1985-97, but the absolute size of China’s operations leaves 
these gains relatively small. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam have much 
smaller share of medium and high tech products in manufacturing value added. 
This can be seen from the technological content of manufactured exports (see 
next section), which is the more important basis of comparison for cross-border 
movement of products. The slow increase in product upgrade within 
manufacturing value added involving China compared to the Southeast Asian 
economies is also a reflection of its size as well as massive FDI inflows 
involving the latter following the Plaza Accord of 1985 and the withdrawal of 
the GSP from the Asian NIEs in February 1988. Given China’s gigantic size, 
export shares alone – where upgrading has taken place extensively – could add 
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competitive pressures in Southeast Asia. China’s greater integration with 
Southeast Asia would of course offer room for import penetration from 
Southeast Asia. However, that would depend on the capabilities of these 
economies to take advantage of it. It will be difficult as the industrial structures 
involving most of them are similar to China’s. Only Singapore’s appears 
favorably placed in higher value added activities, but even that advantage could 
be wiped out given China’s size and developmental efforts. 
 
The slow upgrading in manufacturing value added suggests that China has not 
restructured significantly in the period 1985-97, thereby offering Southeast 
Asian economies considerable room to reorganize industry. While this is very 
well the broad story of China’s manufacturing sector, faster restructuring 
involving its manufactured exports makes its impact serious. 
 
Table 1: Technological Structure of Manufacturing Value Added, 1985 and 
1997 
1985 1997 
MHT LT RB MHT LT RB 
 
 
 
China 
Thailand 
Malaysia 
Indonesia  
Philippines 
49.1 
17.8 
46.9 
25.2 
22.4 
20.8 
30.3 
  9.8 
14.6 
  9.7 
30.1 
51.9 
43.3 
60.2 
67.9 
50.9 
38.6 
60.1 
40.3 
36.3 
17.9 
24.5 
11.4 
24.8 
10.9 
31.2 
36.8 
28.5 
34.8 
52.8 
New Tigers 28.1 16.1 55.8 43.8 17.9 38.2 
Hong Kong 
Korea 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
38.3 
46.6 
66.9 
43.1 
51.9 
23.5 
12.6 
28.3 
  9.8 
29.9 
20.5 
28.5 
52.5 
60.5 
79.9 
56.5 
30.2 
16.8 
  8.1 
18.5 
17.3 
22.7 
12.0 
25.0 
Mature 
Tigers 
48.7 29.1 22.2 62.4 18.4 19.3 
E. Asia  
Exc. China 
38.4 22.6 39.0 53.1 18.2 28.7 
Source: Extracted from Lall and Albaladejo (2002: Table 2). 
 
Exports 
Southeast Asian economies managed to sustain rapid long term growth through 
export expansion – particularly manufactured exports from the early 1970s in 
the case of Singapore and Malaysia, and the 1980s and 1990s involving 
Thailand and Indonesia, and Philippines, Vietnam and Cambodia respectively.  
While competition for inward-oriented industries is likely to rise, the biggest 
threat China poses is in export markets. The fundamental question facing many 
of the Southeast Asian governments is whether China’s full-scale entry into 
 
 
 
Figure 1: China's Share of Manufacturing Value Added in Combined, 1990-99
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open trade will slice off their markets. In short will the entry of a gigantic ship in 
a slowly growing pool leave a smaller space for Southeast Asian boats to swim. 
It is of course true that China has already been exporting and hence its entry into 
the WTO cannot be viewed as a new entrant forcing out old ones. While this is 
indeed true and therefore should not cause a sudden splash, it is also the case 
that the abolition of several previously constraining agreements – such as the 
MFA – will make China a bigger target for labor-intensive products. In addition, 
China’s build up in high tech infrastructure and given its larger and cheaper 
labor force likely to shift some of the focus on high tech industries there. 
 
Southeast Asia’s overall exports was 4.6 times that of China’s in current US 
dollars in 1970, rising to its peak of 6.4 times in 1978 (see Figure 2). Economic 
transition and rapid manufacturing expansion in China has seen this figure fall 
dramatically to 1.1 times in 1998. While the ratio rose slightly again in 1999, the 
abolition of MFAs, removal of actionable subsidies and quotas, and lowering of 
tariffs is expected to raise further China’s exports. China fared even stronger in 
manufactured exports. Southeast Asia’s manufactured export ratio with China 
was 1.4 in 1984, which rose to its peak of 3.1 in 1993 (see Figure 3). However, 
the ratio has fallen sharply since to 0.9 in 1999. The relative expansion in 
China’s manufacturing exports from 1993 also exemplifies China’s rising export 
competitiveness against its decline involving Southeast Asia in this period. 
 
The technological content of the manufactured export structure is another 
indicator that suggests that China is raising its competitive profile against its 
Southeast Asian neighbors (see Table 2). The new tigers in Southeast Asia have 
kept their lead over China on the share of high tech products. Singapore is the 
only exception in Southeast Asia, but its tiny size is unlikely to stop China’s 
expansion. What Table 2 shows is that China and the Southeast Asian market 
economies have expanded their share of high tech products in total exports. 
However, it also shows that China has experienced far higher growth than its 
Southeast Asian neighbors have. China also leads in the exports of several 
medium tech items. For example, China exported over 20 and 12 percent of the 
world’s radio receivers and clocks and watches respectively in 1998 (Lall and 
Albadejeho, 2001). Given Southeast Asian firms’ reliance on foreign R&D 
support – whether by foreign affiliates or local companies (through licensing) – 
it would not cost much for firms to relocate in China to take advantage of 
China’s large and cheap labor force.  
 
The significance of China’s exports over Southeast Asia also becomes obvious 
from Table 3. Southeast Asia’s five new tigers enjoyed a market share of almost 
three times that of China in 1985. However, as China manufactured exports 
expanded sharply in the 1990s, its overall export share became equal to the new 
tigers in 1998. China accounted for 17 percent of manufactured exports from the 
 
 
 
Figure 2: China's Share in Combined Exports, 1970-99 
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Figure 3: China's Share in Combined Manufactured Exports, 1984-99
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1984 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Year
P
e
rc
en
t 
(%
)
Source: Computed from World Bank (2001)
 
9 
 
 
 
Figure 4: World Market Share, Electronics Products, China and Malaysia, 1997
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Table 2: Manufactured Export Structure, 1985 and 1998 
1985 1998 
Average Annual 
growth rates  
(1985-98) 
 
HT MT LT RB HT MT LT RB HT MT LT RB 
China   5.2 12.2 43.7 38.8 20.0 20.2 50.0   9.9 43.2 34.2 30.5 16.2
Thailand   4.7 22.0 35.4 37.9 34.8 20.5 25.3 19.3 41.4 20.6 18.2 15.1
Malaysia 26.9 11.4   8.0 53.7 52.1 20.3 11.0 16.7 23.0 22.2 19.8   6.9
Indonesia   3.0   6.4 15.5 75.2   9.7 18.5 33.0 38.8 27.2 26.0 23.1 10.4
Philippines 11.0   9.0 24.1 56.0 67.4 10.9 14.5   7.2 38.8 22.5 16.1   3.1
New 
Tigers 
10.2 12.2 25.3 52.3 36.8 18.1 26.8 18.4 28.0 22.2 19.3   9.2
Hong Kong 14.8 19.1 63.0   3.2 26.0 13.2 56.3   4.5   7.5   0.0   2.0   5.7
Korea 12.8 37.2 41.4   8.6 29.8 38.5 21.0 10.7 19.1 11.9   5.9 13.5
Singapore 24.5 23.4   8.6 43.5 60.2 18.7   7.0 14.1 22.1 12.0 12.1   4.5
Taiwan 16.2 21.1 52.9   9.9 36.6 27.5 30.4   5.5 17.6 12.7   5.8   5.5
Mature 
Tigers 
17.1 25.2 41.5 16.3 38.2 24.5 28.7   8.7 18.7 11.3   5.4   7.1
E. Asia 
exc. China 
13.6 18.7 33.4 34.3 37.5 21.3 27.7 13.5 20.8 12.8   7.6   8.0
Source: Extracted from Lall and Albaladejo (2001: Table 4). 
 
developing economies in 1998, making it the largest among them. This is a 
dramatic rise from the 3.1 percent it accounted for in 1985 (Lall and Albaladejo, 
2001). While China still lags behind Singapore on high technology, its 
expansion rate suggests that it would not take long before it surpasses the latter. 
China’s grip on low technology raises considerable concerns for Indonesia, 
Philippines and the transitional economies of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam. China already had a healthy lead in world export market shares in six 
of the nine important electronics products over Southeast Asia’s chief 
electronics exporter, i.e. Malaysia (see Figure 4). China also enjoyed a big lead 
in the eight major low technology exports over Indonesia and Thailand (see 
Figure 5). Integration with China should mean increased competition in the low- 
technology as well as high technology products exported by Southeast Asian 
economies. 
 
Compared to Southeast Asia, China has particularly expanded sharply in low 
technology products. China enjoyed world market shares of over 15 per cent in 
five low technology products - led by toys and sporting goods and followed by 
footwear (Lall and Albaladejo, 2001). Garment exports from Malaysia and 
Thailand had already declined from the 1990s following the exhaustion of labor 
reserves and rising wages. Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos were important 
recipients of garment manufacturing from Malaysia and Thailand. Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos experienced rapid garment export expansion in the 1990s 
with FDI inflows from Northeast Asia, Thailand, Malaysia and Europe in 
particular. Indonesia and Philippines also absorbed considerable export 
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manufacturing in garments in the 1990s – but has faced a hollowing out to 
China, Cambodia and Vietnam from 1999. Quota provisions under the MFA 
were very much as important as low wages in the relocation of these industries 
(see Rasiah 1998; 2000). However, the phasing out of the MFA should remove 
that advantage and hence has set into motion another round of relocation of 
these industries again. Several firms reported leaving Indonesia and Philippines 
in 2001-2002.5 Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam could face the same situation once 
they no longer enjoy least developed country (LDC) privileges, though their 
lower wages could sustain low technology manufacturing.  Given that garment 
constituted the chief manufactured export of Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam and 
Laos in 1997, it could still bring considerable ramifications for their labor 
markets. 
 
China’s high tech, medium tech and low tech exports grew by 43.2, 34.2 and 
30.5 percent per annum on average between the years 1985-98 (see Table 2). 
Using past rates, Lall and Albaladejo (2001) calculated that China’s high tech 
exports would reach US$201 billion in 2003, far exceeding the highest Asian 
NIE, i.e. Singapore, figure of US$168 billion. The faster growth of Chinese 
industries over Southeast Asia’s also means that incomes in the former is rising 
faster to expand effective demand. The rise in incomes coupled with extensive 
restructuring should gradually reduce the export-intensity of output involving 
China so that much of the imports and exports will be sourced domestically in 
the long run.  
 
Table 3: World market share of manufactured exports, 1985 and 1998 
1985 1998  
Total HT MT LT RB Total HT MT LT RB 
China 0.5 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.8 3.9 3.1 2.0 10.4 2.2 
Thailand 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.6 1.4 1.2 
Malaysia 0.7 1.1 0.2 0.3 1.5 1.5 3.2 0.8 0.9 1.5 
Indonesia 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.3 1.1 1.4 
Philippines 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.8 0.2 0.5 0.3 
New Tigers 1.4 1.3 0.4 1.3 3.4 3.9 6.7 1.8 3.9 4.3 
Hong Kong 1.2 1.1 0.6 4.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.2 1.6 0.1 
Korea 2.3 1.7 2.1 5.0 0.8 2.8 3.4 2.8 3.1 1.7 
Singapore 1.5 2.2 0.8 0.7 2.7 2.4 5.8 1.2 0.9 2.0 
Taiwan 2.3 2.2 1.2 6.4 0.9 2.5 3.6 1.8 4.0 0.8 
Mature Tigers 7.2 7.1 4.6 16.3 4.6 8.2 13.3 5.9 9.6 4.6 
E. Asia  
exc. China 
8.7 8.4 5.1 17.6 8.0 12.1 20.0 7.7 13.6 8.9 
Source: Extracted from Lall and Albaladejo (2001: Table 5).
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: World Export Market Share, Selected Low Technology Products, China, Indonesia and 
Thailand, 1997
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FDI Flows 
China became the largest recipient of FDI among developing economies in the 
1990s and hence although Southeast Asia has some of the most FDI-dominated 
economies, greater integration between these economies could shift more 
foreign capital to the former.  Arguments about the potential for greater cross 
border inter-industry linkages may not hold because of major differences in 
wages, infrastructure support and structural interdependence. In the presence of 
a united common market of China and Southeast Asia, it is possible to imagine 
the spread of FDI across borders. However, monetary union between these 
economies does not look possible at least in the near future and given China’s 
labor force, much of the differentiation and division of labor in the combined 
region could be confined to its own borders.  
 
As shown in Figure 6, China only accounted for 6.5 percent of the combined net 
FDI inflows to the region in 1982. This figure rose sharply to 69.7 percent in 
1999. Both the sheer size and the rapid increase in the overall FDI flows to the 
region suggests that China is indeed a major threat to Southeast Asia. The 
removal of the MFA and direct and freer trade would make China’s labor force 
even more attractive for labor-intensive and low technology FDI.  
 
While China accounts for much of the FDI, it is not the most FDI-dependent 
economy in the region. The high share of domestic investment acts as a catalyst 
to attract more FDI inflows to China. As a proportion of GFCF, FDI reached its 
peak of 15.1 percent in 1994 before contracting gradually to 10.5 percent in 
1999 (see Table 4). Indonesia faced a negative share in the late 1990s following 
the political explosion that accompanied the financial crisis. The other was 
Malaysia – traditionally strong on FDI - had a lower share of FDI in GFCF in 
the late 1990s – caused primarily by exhaustion in labor reserves and the 
contagion from the financial crisis. For both political and economic reasons 
respectively Indonesia and Malaysia appear less attractive for large-scale FDI 
inflows in the near future. Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam became more 
FDI-dependent than China in the 1990s. Thailand faced a higher rise in net FDI 
inflows in the late 1990s as a consequence of a sharp depreciation in assets from 
the financial crisis and capital flight. The transitional economies were able to 
attract labor-intensive low wage manufacturing activities in the late 1990s. 
Singapore has always relied strongly on FDI. These developments suggest that 
China enjoys greater leverage to attract more FDI than its Southeast Asian 
neighbors and hence may divert scarce capital from employing more labor.  
 
Basic and R&D Infrastructure  
It has been argued that China will not be able to attract high tech investment and 
compete in higher value added export markets because of its specialization in 
labor-intensive low technology activities. While the labor-intensive economies
 
 
 
Figure 6: China's Share of Net FDI Inflows in Combined Total, 1982-1999
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Table 4: Net FDI Flows, 1970-99 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Cambodia 0.00     0.00    23.54 
China 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.44     2.83    12.54   10.52
Indonesia 5.43  6.26  0.96  1.27     3.11    6.73    -8.13
Malaysia 9.85    14.07    12.36  7.96   16.38    10.78   8.83
Lao PDR   0.00     20.81 
Philippines    -1.75  2.13     -1.12  0.25     4.95    8.88  4.03
Singapore     12.89    22.76    13.92   41.50    24.99   25.10
Thailand     2.37  0.55   2.01  1.49     6.92    2.97   23.83
Vietnam      1.91  42.85   22.07
Source: Computed from World Bank (2001) 
 
with weak infrastructure such as the transitional economies of Southeast Asia, 
Philippines and Indonesia will come under tremendous pressure, China’s build 
up in basic and R&D infrastructure suggests that the others would not be spared. 
 
Figure 7 was constructed to locate China’s comparative strength in basic and 
R&D infrastructure against the Southeast Asian economies. The basic 
infrastructure index (BII) was constructed using primary school enrolment rates, 
doctors per thousand population and number of main telephone lines. The 
selection of the proxies was based on basic infrastructure attributes and 
availability of data. Housing, computer supply and internet lines were not used 
to capture the transitional economies of Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam 
where data was more difficult to obtain These proxies were than normalized for 
180 economies where data was available, and using the following formula. 
 
X1= (Vj-Vmin)/(Vmax-Vmin)    
    (1) 
 
Where X1 refers to proxy 1, Vi to its for country i, and Vmin refers to the 
minimum value attained among the countries, and Vmax the maximum value 
attained among the countries. 
 
BII = 1/3[X1..X3]     
    (2) 
 
Where BII refers to the basic infrastructure index and X1, X2 and X3 proxies of 
gross secondary school enrolment rates, doctors per thousand people and main 
telephone lines. Each proxy was given equal weights because of no a priori 
basis for differential emphasis. 
 
The same procedure was used to compute the R&D index (RDI).  
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RDI = ½[X4+X5]     
    (3) 
 
Where RDI refers to the R&D index and the proxies X4 and X5 R&D investment 
in Gross National Investment and scientists and engineers per million people.  
 
The lack of R&D investment data on Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam prevented 
the computation of a full series involving the RDI. Only Singapore 
outperformed China’s basic and R&D infrastructure in 1998. While Malaysia 
outwardly enjoys better infrastructure than China as a whole, the BII of the latter 
exceeded the former slightly. Despite its massive population, China seems to 
demonstrate higher levels of BII and RDI than Malaysia. Vietnam comes 
relatively close. Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia lag behind. The past pre-
occupation non-market oriented infrastructure may still disadvantage especially 
Vietnam, which began Doi Moi in 1989. Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos face a 
bleak situation as these economies neither have the basic infrastructure nor a 
comparable labor force size to compete with China. Nevertheless, these figures 
reveal a stark fact that China enjoys potentially strong infrastructure support to 
better stimulate firms’ operations than its Southeast Asian neighbors. Only 
Singapore enjoys a lead in these indicators to differentiate its product niche. 
However, given its tiny size and China’s pace of expansion, even Singapore may 
face problems. 
 
While patents are not an exhaustive measure of innovating ability, its close 
relationship with R&D infrastructure (see Rasiah, 2002) makes it a useful 
instrument to examine cross country differences in patenting capabilities. China 
recorded the highest number of 12,786 patents by residents in 1997 (see Figure 
8).6 Singapore had 8,188 patents. The rest had very small numbers. Using 
patents as a measure, China clearly demonstrates far stronger innovating 
capability then most of the Southeast Asian economies. Singapore is the only 
exception, but still lagged behind China. 
 
It can be seen that China’s greater integration in global markets under the WTO 
and subsequently with AFTA in 2010 is likely to create wide ramifications for 
the Southeast Asian economies. China’s greater integration and its consequent 
effect on industrial relocation were conspicuous from the late 1980s. China’s 
enormous size and similarity of manufactured exports structure, and its 
continued success in attracting inward FDI could pose serious problems for 
Southeast East Asian economies. The rapid upgrading of manufactured exports 
and expansion in infrastructure – basic and R&D – means that even 
technologically superior Singapore may not be spared. The implications are 
likely to be most profound involving tradable industries. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Basic and R&D Infrastructure Index, 1998
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Figure 8: Resident Patents Applications, 1998
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Implications for South East Asian Labor Markets 
The previous section established the competitive threat posed by China 
following its accession to WTO and subsequent integration with AFTA by 2010, 
which is likely to increase the pressure for restructuring in Southeast Asia. The 
pressure has already been felt as several firms reported relocating to China 
especially labor-intensive and knowledge-intensive electronics industries from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore since the late 1990s.7 
Southeast Asian economies have also demonstrated their versatility in adapting 
to crises – especially the extremely strong trade dependent Singapore, Malaysia 
and Thailand – so that industrial restructuring have helped overcome 
downswings. However, only Singapore has managed to regulate restructuring 
without significant impoverishment to its workers. This section draws 
implications for labor markets in Southeast Asia. It focuses on China’s labor 
force capacity to absorb further economic expansion and what that could mean 
for labor markets in Southeast Asia. 
 
Employment and Unemployment 
China’s labor force grew much more slowly than Southeast Asia’s over the 
period 1960-99, but still accounted for 75 percent of the region’s combined total 
in 1999 (see Figure 9). China’s new addition to the labor force still accounted 
for 56.7 percent of the addition to the combined region in 1999. This huge share 
could obviously apply more pressure on Southeast Asia as greater integration in 
world and regional markets would attract more exports and FDI inflows. China’s 
surge in attracting FDI inflows and export manufactures since the 1990s to some 
extent came at the expense of Southeast Asia. With greater integration following 
accession to WTO and with AFTA in 2010, China’s labor force and lower 
wages would have a bigger bearing on industrial growth in Southeast Asia. 
China’s massive labor force and low wages would discourage FDI outflows. 
 
Table 5 shows the composition of economies in the combined labor force in the 
period 1960-99. China’s industrial structure could pull industries away from 
low-income economies of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines 
as well as from middle income economies of Malaysia and Thailand. The labor 
force in these economies too small to offer significant economic benefits from 
agglomeration. Singapore has a tiny labor force, but its focus on shifting to high 
value added activities has offered the room to stave competition from China. 
However, agglomeration economics, sustained growth in science and technology 
institutions and cheaper production costs has attracted even some high tech 
operations to China.  
 
China enjoyed a steady rate of employment growth since 1960, slowing down 
gradually from 1990 as the base expanded and technological transition shifted 
emphasis to high tech exports (see Table 6). However, China still added more to 
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its labor force in the 1990s then Southeast Asia combined. China’s and 
Southeast Asia’s labor force expanded by 78.9 and 46.1 million workers 
respectively in the period 1990-99.8 Employment elasticity typically rises as 
labor absorption rises in the early stages of economic development when 
unemployment rates are expected to be high. Singapore and China turned this 
stage in the early 1980s (see Table 6). The transitional economies show a rising 
employment elasticity trend, which is expected given their orientation to export 
markets from essentially the 1990s. Philippines faced high employment 
elasticity in 1995-99, which is consequence of the re-emergence of export 
manufacturing following de-industrialization and stagnation from the 1980s. 
Malaysia’s high employment elasticity is in addition to slow GDP growth in the 
late 1990s, is also a reflection of continued reliance on labor-intensive exports. 
Indonesia and Thailand had negative employment elasticities in this period 
because of the sharp decline in GDP caused by a severe financial crisis. These 
results suggest that Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia could face 
problems to sustain employment absorption following greater integration of 
China in global markets. Malaysia has already embarked on aggressive foreign 
labor deportations.  
 
Lall and Albaladejo (2001) reported that overall manufacturing wages in 
Philippines was 5.4 times that in China in 1997. Wages in Singapore, Malaysia 
and Thailand are higher still. Broken by low tech and high tech industries, the 
differential between 1997 wages in China, Malaysia and Thailand was also 
enormous. While Chines wages have grown faster than most Southeast Asian 
economies, the gap is still huge. For example, average wages in low technology 
industries in China was almost three times and over six times that of Thailand 
and Malaysia respectively in 1997 (see Figure 10). The gap involving high tech 
industries was even higher – over five and eight times respectively. Only the 
transitional economies of Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam are expected 
to lower wages. Hill (2000: Table 8) reported that hourly wages in textile 
manufacturing in China (50 US cents an hour) in 1994 slightly higher than that 
of Vietnam. On the basis of wage cost alone, it could be argued that Vietnam 
and to a less extent Cambodia could sustain garment and textile manufacturing 
despite greater integration with China. It is little wonder that firms reported in 
2001 and 2002 the relocation of similar firms from Thailand and Philippines to 
China, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.9 However Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
lack the infrastructure to support horizontal integration in garment and textile 
manufacturing and hence is likely to retain only some parts of low value added 
segments in value chains. This development is very much expected with the 
expected termination of the MFA by the end of 2004. 
 
Unemployment data on developing economies is generally unreliable. Besides, 
given the definition for employed is when eligible people are working for an 
 
 
 
Figure 9: China's Labor force Share in Combined, 1960-99
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Table 5: Composition of the Combined Labor Force, 1960-99 (%) 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Brunei  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 0.01
Cambodia  0.63  0.66  0.65  0.60  0.53  0.53  0.54  0.58 0.61
China 78.22  77.57  77.92  77.98  77.50   77.01  76.69  75.82  74.99
Indonesia 8.17  8.38  8.24  8.21  8.43  8.72  8.93  9.43    9.92
Malaysia 0.63  0.68  0.69  0.71  0.76  0.78  0.81  0.87 0.93
Myanmar 2.49  2.56  2.52  2.46  2.47  2.46  2.38  2.36 2.38
Laos 0.26  0.26  0.26  0.25  0.24  0.23  0.23  0.23 0.24
Philippines 2.35  2.52  2.58  2.63  2.71  2.78  2.78  2.96 3.11
Singapore 0.12  0.13  0.13  0.15  0.16  0.17  0.18  0.19 0.19
Thailand 2.99  3.17  3.20  3.33  3.51  3.58  3.62  3.65 3.63
Vietnam 4.14  4.05  3.78  3.67  3.69  3.72  3.83  3.90 3.97
Source: Computed from World Bank (2001). 
 
Table 6: Average Annual Employment Growth and Elasticities, 1960-99 
Growth 1960- 
65 
1965-
70 
1970-
75 
1975-
80 
1980-
85 
1985-
90 
1990-
95 
1995-
99 
Brunei 4.5 4.6 6.1 5.3 4.8 4.6 3.2 2.3
Cambodia 2.3 2.3 1.0    -0.3 2.4 2.8 3.0 2.1
China 1.2 2.5 2.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 1.4 0.8
Indonesia 1.9 2.1 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.1
Malaysia 3.1 2.6 3.6 3.5 2.8 3.2 2.9 2.6
Myanmar 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.3 1.7 1.5 1.2
Laos 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.1 1.9 1.9 2.2 1.8
Philippines 2.8 3.0 3.3 2.7 2.8 2.4 2.9 2.1
Singapore 3.5 2.5 4.9 3.9 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.0
Thailand 2.5 2.6 3.7 3.2 2.7 2.6 1.8 0.9
Vietnam 0.9 1.1 2.3 2.2 2.5 3.0 2.0 1.4
Elasticity    
Brunei   0.5    -1.3   11.6 1.9 
Cambodia   0.5 0.8
China 3.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
Indonesia 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4    -7.0
Malaysia 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.9
Laos   0.5 0.3 0.4
Philippines 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5    -2.2 0.5 1.3 0.8
Singapore 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5
Thailand 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2    -1.8
Vietnam   0.6 0.2 0.3
Source: Computed from World Bank (2001) 
 
hour or more a week and the absence of unemployment welfare benefits, 
unemployment figures in developing economies are generally low. Despite 
having the world’s largest labor force, China only had an unemployment rate of 
3.1 percent in 1998 (see Table 7). Underemployment rates may be more useful 
but the paucity of data makes analysis difficult. It is believed that between 45-55 
percent of the labor force in Indonesia and Philippines were underemployed in 
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1998.10 While the Asian financial meltdown in the late 1990s pushed up 
unemployment rates throughout East and Southeast Asia (see Rasiah, 1998), the  
increased integration of China in the world market and the slow pace of 
technical change in the Southeast Asian economies had already left Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand in a precarious position even before the 
currency crisis erupted. Unemployment rates in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Thailand rose following the financial crisis in the late 1990s. Unless a 
coherent strategy is worked out, full-scale integration is likely to undermine 
employment rates in these economies. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam 
could manage to retain some labor-intensive industries. Because of their 
underdeveloped status and high levels of underemployment, cutthroat 
competition in labor markets could pressure a fall in real wages in these 
economies. However, their small labor forces would restrict their capacity to 
compete with China. 
 
Table 7: Unemployment Rates, 1980-1998 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
China 4.9 1.8 2.5 2.9 3.1
Indonesia 1.7 2.1 2.5 7.2 5.5
Malaysia 5.6 6.9 5.1 2.8 4.9
Philippines 4.8 6.1 8.1 8.4 9.6
Singapore 3.0 4.1 1.7 2.7 3.2
Thailand 0.8 3.7 2.2 1.1 3.4
Source: World Bank (2001) 
 
Labor Productivity  
Productivity differentials are one critical indicator of competitiveness that will 
have a strong bearing on industrial restructuring in the combined region. While 
differences in industrial specialization will continue to sustain growth and 
subsequent trade based on static comparative advantages even under 
circumstances of productivity differentials, the similar composition of China’s 
industrial sectors with Southeast Asia suggests that it will have a strong bearing.  
 
With the exception of the transitional economies, the enormous resource rents 
and participation in higher value added activities gave the remaining Southeast 
Asian economies an enormous lead in labor productivity (see Figure 12 and 
Table 8). However from about 1980, upgrading and structural change following 
increasing integration in the global economy has helped China to continuously 
close the gap. China’s labor productivity grew faster in the period 1990-95 and 
1995-99 then any of the Southeast Asian economies (see Table 9), which helped 
close its distance with the latter. China’s labor productivity growth was higher 
than the region’s combined total since 1980 (see Figure 13). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Wage Differentials, China Against Malaysia and Thailand, 1997
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Table 8: Labor Productivity Differentials, 1960-99  
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Brunei  251.3 267.8 117.8   74.5  42.0  NA
Cambodia   0.8  0.5  0.4
China  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0
Indonesia  3.0  3.2  3.4  3.8  4.2  3.2  3.0  2.3  1.6
Malaysia   13.3   16.6   17.2   18.2   19.5   14.6   13.4  11.1  8.6
Laos   1.3  1.1  0.8  0.7
Philippines  8.7   10.3  9.7  9.8  9.8  5.3  4.6  2.7  2.1
Singapore   38.4   47.0   66.8   74.4   78.3   59.3   59.4  49.0   41.3
Thailand  4.3  5.6  6.7  6.6  7.0  5.3  6.0  5.0  3.5
Vietnam   0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5
Note: Figure measured by [Y/Li][Y/Lc]-1 where Y, L, i and c refer to GDP, Labor force, 
country i and China respectively. 
Source: Computed from World Bank (2001) 
 
Table 9: Labor Productivity Growth, 1960-99 (%) 
 1960-
65 
1965-
70 
1970-
75 
1975-
80 
1980-
85 
1985-
90 
1990-
95 
1995-
99 
Brunei  4.7   -8.0   -4.0    -1.5 NA
Cambodia    2.9 0.7
China   -0.8  2.7 2.2 3.3 8.4 5.3   10.5 7.2
Indonesia 0.1  4.1 4.9 5.1 2.5 4.2  4.9   -2.9
Malaysia 3.7  3.4 3.4 4.9 2.2 3.5  6.4 0.5
Laos  2.3  4.1 3.9
Philippines 2.4  1.6 2.4 3.2   -4.0 2.3 -0.7 0.7
Singapore 3.3   10.2 4.4 4.4 2.5 5.3  6.3 2.7
Thailand 4.5  6.4 2.0 4.6 2.6 7.6  6.6   -1.8
Vietnam  1.7  6.1 5.2
Note: Figures refer to average annual growth rates using GDP in 1995 US$. 
Source: Computed from World Bank (2001) 
 
Past rates suggest that China’s labor productivity could easily overtake that of its 
Southeast Asian neighbors over time. Viewed together with its massive labor 
force and low wages, China’s greater integration in global and regional markets 
could raise the pressure on Southeast Asian labor markets.  
 
Manufacturing Wages and Unit Labor Costs 
Wages have often been argued to be a major factor explaining labor-intensive 
inward FDI flows to developing economies. However, unit labor costs is a better 
instrument to denote competitiveness, albeit it is more effective if comparisons 
are made between like industries. Using average Singaporean monthly wages as 
the base, Table 10 shows that the share of average manufacturing wages of 
China, China Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Myanmar (only by gender 
breakdown), Philippines and Thailand. Data for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
were not available.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Labor Productivity Differentials, China Against Southeast Asia, 1960-99
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Figure 12:Average Annual  Labor Productivity Growth, 1960-99
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Table 10: Manufacturing Wage Differentials, 1986-97 (Singapore=100) 
 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
China 6.9 6.6 7.2 7.0 4.7 4.0 4.1 4.3 3.2 NA NA NA
HK 91.2 95.8 94.9 94.7 89.7 86.2 81.9 83.3 79.2 70.8 70.0 74.5
India 15.8 13.9 11.9 8.1 7.3 5.1 3.5 2.9 2.3 2.5 NA NA
Malaysia 55.0 51.9 42.7 37.1 31.7 29.1 30.1 29.3 27.1 26.2 NA NA
Philippines 23.9 25.7 25.6 24.8 22.9 19.6 20.4 18.4 18.2 17.0 NA NA
Singapore 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Thailand 22.3 NA NA 18.3 17.0 16.1 15.2 14.5 12.9 13.2 13.2 11.7
Note: Monthly wages in national currencies converted to US dollars using end year exchange rates. 
 
Source: Computed from UNSTATS-ILO (2001) 
 
 
Table 11: Annual Average Growth in Monthly Manufacturing Wages,  Value Added and Unit Labor Costs, 1980-97 
 
Wages/Employee VA/Employee Wages/VA 
1980-87 1987-90 1990-93 1993-97 1987-90 1990-93 1993-97 1987-90 1990-93 1993-97
China -4.4 4.7 9.9 NA 6.4 14.3 12.5 -1.2 -3.8 NA 
Indonesia NA NA NA NA 1.8 5.9 3.5 NA NA NA 
Malaysia 5.2 -0.7 10.5 10.1 4.2 2.6 8.6 -3.5 7.8 0.4 
Philippines 1.1 12.7 5.4 11.9 3.8 -4.2 2.4 6.3 10.0 8.2 
Singapore NA 17.2 13.4 10.5 4.2 5.9 NA 5.4 5.6 NA 
Thailand 8.4 7.0 7.6 4.7 7.2 3.0 4.9 -0.4 4.4 -0.2 
 
Source: Computed from World Bank (2001); UNSTATS-ILO (2002) 
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Figure 13: Unit Labor Cost Comparisons, Manufacturing, 1987-95
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Singaporean wages remained higher than that of the combined region. China’s 
average monthly wages were comparable to that of only India, though China’s 
sustained rapid growth has translated in its wages outstripping India’s from 
1992. However, China’s wage rate remains much lower than that of the 
Southeast Asian economies in Table 10. With the exception of the period 1980-
87, Chinese average wages grew strongly in the periods 1987-90 and 1990-93, 
but its manufacturing labor productivity grew much more in both periods (see 
Table 11).  
 
Southeast Asia performed better when the more important variable, i.e. unit 
labor cost, is compared (see Figure 11). Manufacturing unit labor costs in China 
exceeded that of Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in the period 
1988-90. While China’s superiority in unit labor costs is much less and only 
exceeded that of Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore from 1991, it shows a 
trend fall after 1989 (see Table 11). Even though Thailand has continuously 
performed better than China in the period 1989-94, the gap has consistently 
narrowed. China’s unit labor costs declined in 1987-90 and 1990-93. Unit labor 
costs involving the Southeast Asian economies – especially after 1990 – have 
fared worse than China’s. If China maintains its greater increases in labor 
productivity compared to wage rise, it will add serious pressure on Southeast 
Asian labor markets. These developments suggest that China’s greater 
integration in global and regional markets will raise competitive pressure on 
Southeast Asian labor markets. 
 
Trade Unions and Labor Standards 
The increased pressure on labor demand is likely to intensify competition with a 
consequent weakening of trade unions and downward spiral on wages in 
Southeast Asia.  The impact on the individual economies would be different 
because of the diversity of institutional arrangements involving trade unions and 
workers, and labor standards. Despite the generally stronger institutional 
participation by trade unions, the underdeveloped status and low-income levels 
in transitional economies has left labor standards generally poor. Even child 
labor is most rampant in the transitional economies. Unless effective strategies 
are launched, these conditions may weaken in the initial phase as stronger 
competition is unleashed from greater integration. 
 
Trade unions tend to enjoy greater representation in the transitional economies 
of China, and Vietnam owing to strong antecedents with the politburo. Laos, 
Myanmar and Cambodia lacked similar histories. Singapore has managed to 
integrate trade union involvement in the political process since 1969 and hence 
also enjoys strong union densities (Wong, 1998; Rasiah and Chua, 1998). 
Democratization of the labor movement after the collapse of the Marcos regime
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did not produce a similar impact in Philippines. Rivalry among trade unions has 
undermined their collective ability to participate effectively on the negotiating 
table with employers and the government. Indonesia is currently facing a similar 
process of democratization following the collapse of the Suharto regime, 
showing a weakening of trade union institutions. Malaysia and Thailand – the 
latter despite considerable democratization since the late 1990s – have faced 
general exclusion from the political process. 
 
Trade unions in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand are reporting 
pressure from multinational corporations to keep their activities down. There is 
already increasing threat from these companies to relocate to China and 
Vietnam. In fact these companies could also play one location with another to 
undermine the trade union power and prevent efforts to improve labor standards. 
The lack of strong trade union representation and coordination between them 
has actually reduced many of them to passive rather than active actors in the 
operations of multinational corporations. Only Singapore and to some extent 
Vietnam has managed to achieve stronger representation – facilitated by their 
active participation in the political process (see Rasiah and Chua, 1998). 
 
Governments will be hard-pressed to contain trade union activity in countries 
such as Malaysia where the Malaysian Trade Union Congress’ (MTUC) struggle 
is still capped strongly. With a smoother integration in the political process, the 
National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) might intensify upgrading efforts in 
Singapore in addition to becoming even more selective in its immigration 
policies. The loose framework in Philippines and Indonesia - where 
democratization has taken place without significant institutional development - 
may actually widen the gap in the already created dual labor market (Rasiah and 
Chua, 1998). The informal low wage and undefined labor market segment could 
expand leaving workers more vulnerable to retrenchments that follow crises. 
Labor exports may intensify to overcome persistent unemployment from 
reaching high levels domestically. Overseas contract workers contributed the 
major share of GNP of Philippines for a number of years now (Ofreneo, 1998). 
Indonesia has already experienced fast growth in workers seeking jobs abroad. 
Thailand could face similar pressures soon. However, given the constraints 
labor-importing economies in the region are currently facing (e.g. Singapore, 
Malaysia and Thailand), governments are likely to increase their already 
aggressive means of keeping illegal migration out.  
 
Meanwhile, the pursuit of low wages may reverse child employment trends in 
Southeast Asia. Children aged 10-14 working in Brunei and Singapore ended in 
Brunei and Singapore by the 1980s (see Table 12). The incidence fell gradually 
in the other economies, though it remained high in Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos 
and Thailand. Child employment could be aggravated in these economies as low 
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skill-intensity firms seek cheaper and short-termist wage labor from the 
unorganized informal labor markets. 
 
Table 12: Share of Child Labor in 10-14  Age Group , 1960-99 (%) 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 1999 
Brunei 9.12 7.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cambodia 28.43 27.48 26.56 25.59 24.66 23.92
China 43.17 39.03 30.48 15.24 11.55 8.60
Indonesia 22.11 18.52 13.49 11.30 9.55 8.17
Malaysia 10.12 8.38 7.97 3.99 3.16 2.50
Myanmar 31.55 29.72 27.91 26.07 24.51 23.25
Laos 35.00 33.01 31.03 29.05 27.20 25.73
Philippines 21.40 17.65 14.10 10.64 8.04 5.96
Singapore 5.58 3.44 1.71 0.00 0.00 0.00
Thailand 35.19 30.20 25.21 20.23 16.22 13.01
Vietnam 36.17 26.27 21.78 13.01 9.12 5.99
Source: Extracted from World Bank (2001) 
 
Greater integration of China with Southeast Asia could obviously bring wide 
ramifications for on the latter’s labor markets. If greater integration enhances 
complementarities and structural interdependence to encourage stronger 
industrial relations frameworks, it could stimulate a trend fall in unemployment 
and bring improvements in labor standards. However, the power asymmetry 
between institutions, location endowments and governments, and industry 
dynamics that favor agglomeration of production in particular locations is likely 
to intensify competition in final and intermediate product markets. The past 
suggests that China’s labor productivity could soon overtake the neighbors. 
Governments in Southeast Asia could face greater pressure to prevent 
unemployment and underemployment from rising. Trade unions would be hard 
pressed to sustain membership and labor standards in the face of greater labor 
market disruptions.  
 
5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
It appears that China’s greater integration in world and regional markets would 
raise competitive pressure on the Southeast Asian labor markets. While China’s 
huge domestic market – expected to expand strongly with rapid increases in per 
capita incomes – would increase effective demand, its large labor force and 
strong participation in most manufacturing industries suggest that it will be very 
difficult for Southeast Asian economies to take advantage of it. The transitional 
economies of especially Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam could still retain low 
technology industries because of their low wages. With its small labor force, 
Laos might become more resource dependent as cheaper imports from China, 
Cambodia and Vietnam flood its market. However, weak basic infrastructure 
and their smaller labor forces could still hold them back rapid growth in 
Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam. Philippines and Indonesia could face serious 
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restructuring – especially the relocation of labor-intensive garment, textile and 
electronics to China and Vietnam. Malaysia and Thailand have good basic 
infrastructure but lack sufficient institutional deepening to differentiate their 
industries from China’s. The increasing focus on R&D in China suggests that 
these economies could face serious pressure even involving high tech industries. 
Singapore is still favorably positioned to retain high tech activities. However, 
given China’s sheer size and past rates of investment in R&D, production of 
scientists and engineers and patenting, Singapore’s advantage may not continue 
for long. These implications are unlikely to destroy the Southeast Asian 
economies as their past resilience in handling crises have demonstrated. Instead 
they are outline to show that Southeast Asian economies will have to work 
harder to sustain improvements in their labor markets. 
 
In light of the competitive pressure China’s greater economic integration with 
the global economy requires important considerations for Southeast Asia to 
catch rather than be swept aside by competitive wave. This pressure becomes all 
the more important considering China’s dominance in low technology activities, 
rising strength in high technology activities, and relentless emphasis on building 
its R&D infrastructure. 
 
To overcome the competitive pressure brought by China, the Southeast Asian 
economies could coordinate cross border economic activities. A good strategy is 
to cooperate with China to integrate economic activities synergistically to 
achieve the regions common goals. Similar initiatives through the active 
promotion of growth triangles since 1989 have not proved very successful as 
economies retained their individual interests at the expense of systemic 
synergies. Southeast Asian economies must invest more on strengthening their 
human capital so that the increasing knowledge content would enhance labor 
productivity and commensurate increases in wages offer the effective demand 
for engaging a wider spectrum of labor force in the combined region. The other 
alternative will be to build particular niches to differentiate industrial 
specialization – either based on individual national strategies or collectively with 
two or more economies – to establish long term comparative advantage over 
China and the rest of the world. This is not easy as China enjoys enormous size 
to launch new products in almost every industry, which Southeast Asia plans to 
develop. 
 
Increase Investment in Basic and R&D Infrastructure 
Southeast Asian economies must increase their emphasis on human capital 
development – both education and technical training. Given the lack of funds, 
there must be a further shift in government expenditure from military spending 
to education and training, and R&D activities. In addition, Indonesia, 
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Philippines and the transitional economies of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam must also improve their basic infrastructure. 
 
The Southeast Asian response should be to raise labor productivity by reducing 
unit labor costs rather than suppressing a rise in wage rates. Education and 
training, and participation in innovation-related activities are key to achieving 
this goal. The latter will be difficult to achieve systematically the lower the per 
capita income. While basic expenditure will continue to be important for the 
poorer economies, there must be increasing effort to build the high tech 
infrastructure so that a horizontal division of labor eventually could be 
developed with China and the developed economies. Singapore is well ahead. 
Malaysia has the resources, but requires considerable deepening (including 
expansion in high tech human capital) and improvement in firm-institution 
coordination relationships (see Rasiah, 2002). 
 
Strengthen Regional Coordination 
China and the Southeast Asian economies must strengthen dialogue to 
coordinate industrial restructuring. Given the stormy effects of unregulated trade 
under conditions of prevalence of free riders and power asymmetry between 
competitors, coordination is important to prevent predatory conduct in product 
and factor markets. Labor markets are not only notoriously rigid, they are also 
characterized by substantial information imperfections.  
 
This problem would particularly become critical when involving multinational 
corporations. It is important to recognize that Southeast Asian economies cannot 
on their own stand up against gigantic multinational corporations who could 
play one location against another to minimize private costs while leaving the 
social costs to the populations. Trade unions should be included as active 
participants in regional consultation councils such as the AFTA council.   
 
Hence, inter-government coordination is necessary for the creation of a 
competitive institutional environment that works on long rather than short run 
goals. Social responsibility is vital to ensure long run goals and hence the 
incorporation of labor’s interests in Southeast Asian and Chinese industrial 
strategies must be important. 
 
Include Trade Unions as a Critical Participant in National Policies 
In Singapore and Vietnam trade unions are an important integral part of the 
political process. It can be said that labor standards in Singapore are arguably 
the best in the region combined. Singapore has not only managed to ensure rapid 
wage growth alongside its rapid GDP growth, effective social tripatism has 
helped the NTUC coordinate such thorny issues such as economic downswings 
and retrenchments smoothly. Singapore has continued to experience industrial 
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restructuring, but has managed to eliminate absolute poverty and offer access to 
basic needs to all its citizens. While its special initial conditions, strategic 
location and smallness in size is often viewed as unworthy for extracting 
lessons, there is no economic basis to reject it purely on those grounds. While 
size and structural differences make inferences difficult, the other economies 
could attempt incorporating labor movements in the political process but taking 
cognizance of the their own unique structures and histories. After all 
employment creation and better living standards are central to all government 
goals the world over. 
 
Strengthen ILO’s Core Conventions 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has long coordinated labor issues. 
However, its influence in the global governance of labor standards has generally 
been invisible as a consequence of the reluctance of its members to use it as a 
major platform to address critical issues. 
 
Developing economies in general and the economies of the combined region in 
particular could cooperate to seek ILO’s help in protecting exports against unfair 
pressure from the developed economies.  
 
 
 
1 The other agreements such as the Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) are also important but its 
impact on Southeast Asia may be similar to China.  
2 See Popper (1995) for a lucid explication of the limitations of history in understanding the 
future. 
3 Popper (1957) to some extent also misunderstood the rationale behind Marx’s analysis of 
historical materialism to explain the emergence of class societies. 
4 Computed from World development indicators, World Bank (2001) 
5 Author interviews (2001-2002). 
6 Patents applied by foreigners were excluded to show only domestic capabilities and to avoid 
double counting as firms may apply for the same patents in different countries. 
7 Author interviews (2001-2002). 
8 Computed from World Bank (2001). 
9 Author interviews (2001-2002). 
10 Author interviews in Jakarta and Manila in February 1998, which was conducted for the 
FES. 
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